上海市人民政府关于修改《上海市城镇职工养老保险办法》的决定
上海市人民政府
上海市人民政府关于修改《上海市城镇职工养老保险办法》的决定
(1998年9月3日上海市人民政府第59号令发布)
市人民政府决定对《上海市城镇职工养老保险办法》作如下修改：
一、第十八条修改为：
记入个人养老保险帐户的储存额，按不低于同期居民1年期银行定期储蓄存款利率的利率计息。
二、第十九条修改为：
养老保险基金纳入单独的社会保障基金市级财政专户，实行收支两条线，专项管理，专款专用。
三、删除第三十八条、第四十条、第四十一条。
四、对部分条文的顺序作相应的调整。
本决定自1999年1月1日起施行。
《上海市城镇职工养老保险办法》根据本决定作相应修正。
上海市城镇职工养老保险办法
第一章总则
第一条为了保障城镇在职人员退休后的基本生活需要，根据《上海市城镇职工养老保险制度改革实施方案》，制定本办法。
第二条本办法所称养老保险，是指经法定程序确立，由政府主管部门负责组织和管理，单位和在职人员共同承担养老保险费缴纳义务，退休人员按养老保险费缴纳状况享受基本养老保险待遇的社会保障制度。
第三条本办法适用于本市范围内城镇的机关、企业、事业单位（以下简称“单位”）及其在职人员、退休人员。
外商投资企业的外籍人员以及国家另有规定的单位和人员不适用本办法。
第四条养老保险实行国家、单位与个人共同承担费用，个人储存与统筹互济相结合，保障退休人员基本生活需要与激励在职人员积极性相结合的原则。
单位有为在职人员缴纳养老保险费的义务；在职人员有为自身缴纳养老保险费的义务。
在职人员由所在单位为其缴纳养老保险费和退休后享受养老保险待遇的权利受法律保护，任何单位和个人不得侵犯。
第五条本市养老保险制度改革的目标，是逐步建立多层次的养老保险体系。除本办法规定的养老保险外，在有条件的单位，逐步推行单位补充养老保险；鼓励有条件的职工参加个人储蓄养老保险。
第二章组织机构
第六条本市设立市社会保险委员会，负责审议养老保险的发展规划，研究和决定养老保险的重大政策，筹划养老保险基金的保值、增值。
第七条市社会保险管理局具体负责本市养老保险的管理工作。其职责是：
（一）负责养老保险制度的组织实施；
（二）编制养老保险的发展规划；
（三）拟订养老保险的地方性法规、规章草案；
（四）会同有关部门制定养老保险基金的财务、会计、统计和内部审计制度；
（五）监督养老保险费的缴纳、养老金的支付和养老保险基金的增值运营；
（六）领导市和区、县养老保险事业管理中心的工作；
（七）执行市社会保险委员会决定的事项。
第八条养老保险事业管理中心是具体承办养老保险事务的机构。其职责是：
（一）负责养老保险费的收缴和养老金的支付；
（二）管理个人养老保险帐户；
（三）接受单位和在职人员、退休人员对养老保险情况的查询；
（四）办理市社会保险管理局委托或者授权办理的其他事务。
第三章养老保险费的缴纳
第九条凡属于本办法第三条第一款规定范围的单位，均应向市社会保险管理局指定的养老保险事业管理中心办理单位和在职人员的养老保险登记手续；新设立的单位应在设立之日起一个月内办理养老保险登记手续。
单位发生分立、合并、破产或者被撤销以及录用或者辞退在职人员（包括辞职、自动离职和开除、除名等情况）时，应在一个月内向原受理登记的养老保险事业管理中心办理养老保险变更登记或者注销登记手续。
养老保险事业管理中心办理养老保险登记手续时，应为单位设立养老保险编码，为在职人员设立个人养老保险帐户，并核发《养老保险手册》。
第十条在职人员的个人养老保险帐户终生不变。《养老保险手册》记录在职人员在本办法实施前的连续工龄和本办法实施后记入个人养老保险帐户中的储存额，作为退休时计发养老金的依据。
在职人员变动工作单位时，《养老保险手册》随同本人转移。
第十一条养老保险费由单位和在职人员每月按规定期限缴纳，不得逾期缴纳或者漏缴、少缴。
第十二条单位应按本单位上一月全部在职人员工资总额的百分之二十五点五的比例缴纳养老保险费。
在职人员应以本人上一年度月平均工资收入为缴费基数，按百分之三的比例缴纳养老保险费。在职人员上一年度月平均工资收入为上一年度全市在职人员月平均工资收入百分之二百以上的，百分之二百以上的部分不计入缴费基数；低于上一年度全市在职人员月平均工资收入百分之六十
的，以上一年度全市在职人员月平均工资收入的百分之六十为缴费基数。
单位缴纳养老保险费的基数的计算口径，应与在职人员缴纳养老保险费的基数的计算口径相一致。
单位和在职人员养老保险费缴纳比例的调整，由市社会保险管理局提出，报市社会保险委员会决定。
第十三条单位缴纳的养老保险费按下列渠道列支：
（一）企业和自收自支的事业单位在税前列支；
（二）机关和全额预算、差额预算的事业单位从行政费或者事业费中列支。
第十四条养老保险费按以下办法缴纳：
（一）在职人员应缴纳的养老保险费，由单位在其每月工资中代扣。在职人员工资收入中缴纳养老保险费的部分免征个人所得税。
（二）单位每月应按规定时间到养老保险事业管理中心核定本单位和在职人员应缴纳的养老保险费，并按核定数额如数缴纳。
第十五条养老保险事业管理中心对个人养老保险帐户的储存额应每年结算一次，并向在职人员出具养老保险费缴纳清单。
第十六条个人养老保险帐户中应记入的养老保险费包括：
（一）个人缴纳的养老保险费；
（二）单位缴纳的养老保险费记入个人帐户的部分：
（１）按在职人员个人缴费基数（不超过上一年度按全市在职人员月平均工资收入百分之一百五十的部分）的一定比例（企业和自收自支的事业单位为百分之八，机关、全额预算事业单位为百分之十，差额预算事业单位为百分之九）记入的数额；
（２）按上一年度全市在职人员月平均工资收入的百分之五记入的数额。
单位缴纳的养老保险费记入个人帐户的部分，应随个人缴费比例的提高相应调整。
第十七条单位缴纳的养老保险费除记入个人养老保险帐户的部分外，均为社会统筹部分。
第十八条记入个人养老保险帐户的储存额，按不低于同期居民1年期银行定期储蓄存款利率的利率计息。
第十九条养老保险基金纳入单独的社会保障基金市级财政专户，实行收支两条线，
第四章养老保险待遇的享受
第二十条享受养老保险待遇的退休人员应同时具备以下条件：
（一）达到国家、本市规定的退休年龄；
（二）单位和本人按规定缴纳养老保险费；
（三）本办法实施前参加工作、连续工龄（包括缴费年限）满十年，或者本办法实施后参加工作、缴费满十五年。
凡符合前款条件的退休人员，可向养老保险事业管理中心办理领取养老金的手续；经养老保险事业管理中心核定后，按月领取养老金。
第二十一条符合本办法第二十条第一款规定的失业人员，可向养老保险事业管理中心办理手续，按月领取养老金。
第二十二条本办法实施前参加工作、到达退休年龄时连续工龄（包括缴费年限）满五年不满十年的人员，应该退职；连续工龄满五年、因病或者非因工致残的在职人员，经劳动鉴定委员会确认完全丧失劳动能力的，可以退职。
退职人员按规定享受相应的养老待遇。
第二十三条本办法实施前参加工作、连续工龄（包括缴费年限）不满五年或者本办法实施后参加工作、缴费不满十五年，到达退休年龄的人员，可向养老保险事业管理中心提出申请，将其个人养老保险帐户中的全部储存额支付给本人，同时终止养老保险关系。
第二十四条凡符合领取养老金条件的人员，其养老金可终生领取。个人养老保险帐户中的储存额已领完的，其养老金从养老保险基金的社会统筹部分中支付。
第二十五条在职人员、退休人员死亡后，其个人养老保险帐户储存额中属于个人缴纳部分的余额，可一次性发给其经法定程序认定的继承人。
第二十六条市社会保险管理局可要求享受养老保险待遇的人员，按规定时间到养老保险事业管理中心办理复核手续；对不办理复核手续的，可停止支付养老金。
退休人员出国、出境或者因其他原因，本人不能办理复核手续的，应按国家有关规定出具证明其生存的证书。
退休人员出国、出境或者因其他原因，本人不能领取养老金，需委托他人代为领取的，应出具经公证的委托代理书。
第二十七条凡本办法实施后参加工作的人员，其退休后的养老金计算公式为：
月养老金＝个人养老保险帐户储存额÷１２０
第二十八条凡本办法实施前参加工作、一九九五年底前退休和退职的人员，先按原办法计算月养老金，再按个人累计缴费额的一定比例增发月养老金。增发比例按以下规定确定：
（一）企业退休人员的缴费年限加上本办法实施前的连续工龄满十年不满十五年的，增发百分之十一；在此基础上每增加五年相应增加一个百分点，但增发比例最高不超过百分之十六。
（二）机关和事业单位退休人员的缴费年限加上本办法实施前的连续工龄满十年不满十五年的，增发百分之二；在此基础上每增加五年相应增加一个百分点，但增发比例最高不超过百分之七。
（三）企业退职人员增发百分之十；机关和事业单位退职人员增发百分之一。
前款所述人员不论在哪个月份到达退休年龄，退休当年按十二个月缴费，并按前款规定增发养老金。
离休干部、劳动模范、高级专家以及按国家规定可享受提前退休待遇的人员等所享受的优惠待遇，仍按原规定执行。
第二十九条本办法实施前参加工作、一九九六年一月一日以后退休的人员，按其个人养老保险帐户储存额，乘上规定系数，推算为全部工作年限的储存额。其养老金的计算公式为：
月养老金＝个人养老保险帐户储存额×系数÷１２０
按前款规定计发的养老金，如果低于按本办法第二十八条所规定办法计算的养老金标准的，可改按第二十八条规定的办法计发。
第三十条个人养老保险帐户中的储存额，只能用于按月支付退休人员养老金，不能移作他用。
向退休人员支付养老金时，应按个人养老保险帐户中个人缴费额与单位缴费额的比例相应扣减储存额。
第三十一条退休人员养老金的最低标准由市社会保险委员会规定。按规定领取的养老金低于最低标准的，可按最低标准发给。
养老金的最低标准，随经济发展和本市居民消费价格指数上升的情况作调整。
第三十二条退休人员的养老金每年根据本市上一年度居民消费价格指数上升幅度进行调整，于当年四月一日起开始执行。当年退休的人员的养老金自下一年度起调整。居民消费价格指数比上一年度下降时不作调整。
第三十三条本市将根据国民经济的发展和养老保险基金的收支情况，参照在职人员实际工资的增长情况，不定期给予退休人员生活补贴；对有特殊困难的退休人员增加特殊生活补贴。
第三十四条退休人员死亡后的丧葬补助费、供养直系亲属抚恤金、救济金等，按国家和本市的有关规定支付。
第五章养老保险基金的使用和管理
第三十五条养老保险基金的来源包括：
（一）单位和在职人员缴纳的养老保险费；
（二）养老保险基金的利息收入；
（三）养老保险基金的增值运营收入；
（四）依照本办法规定所收取的滞纳金。
第三十六条养老保险基金主要用于退休人员养老金的支付；在养老保险基金不敷支付时，由地方财政给予补贴。
养老保险基金由市社会保险管理局集中管理，专款专用，任何单位和个人不得擅自动用。
第三十七条养老保险基金的支付范围是：
（一）退休人员的养老金；
（二）退休人员死亡后按国家和本市有关规定支付的丧葬补助费、供养直系亲属的抚恤金、救济金等；
（三）在职人员、退休人员死亡后应发给其法定继承人的个人养老保险帐户中属于个人缴纳部分的余额；
（四）按本办法第三十三条规定发放的生活补贴。
经市社会保险委员会核准，养老保险事业管理中心可按养老保险费实际征集额的一定比例提取管理费。
按前款规定提取的管理费免征税、费。
第三十八条养老保险基金必须在保证正常支付和安全的前提下增值运营，不得进行回收期长、风险大或者投机性的投资。运营后归入养老保险基金的增值部分免征税、费。
第三十九条市社会保险管理局应定期或者根据市社会保险委员会的要求，及时对养老保险基金的使用和管理情况进行汇总、核实，向市社会保险委员会汇报。
第四十条对养老保险基金的征集、支付和增值运营，应每年编制预算和决算。
第四十一条养老保险基金的征集、支付和增值运营，应同时接受财政、审计部门和金融主管部门的监督。
第四十二条本市设立由政府有关部门和社会公众代表参加的养老保险基金监督组织，监督养老保险基金的收支和管理。具体办法另行制定。
第六章争议处理与处罚
第四十三条在职人员与单位之间因缴纳养老保险费发生争议的，以及在职人员、退休人员或者单位与养老保险事业管理中心因养老保险问题发生争议的，可向市社会保险管理局申请裁决。
第四十四条在职人员、退休人员或者单位可向养老保险事业管理中心要求核查个人或者单位养老保险费的缴纳情况和养老金的支付情况。养老保险事业管理中心应无偿提供服务。
第四十五条养老保险事业管理中心可定期或者不定期地对养老保险费的缴纳情况进行检查。对不缴、漏缴或者少缴养老保险费的单位，由市社会保险管理局责令其限期缴纳；逾期不缴纳的，市社会保险管理局可以通过银行扣缴，并可处以未缴纳金额一至二倍的罚款。
第四十六条养老保险事业管理中心对逾期缴纳养老保险费的单位，按日增收应缴纳金额千分之二的滞纳金。
滞纳金收入归入养老保险基金。
第四十七条退休人员在享受养老保险待遇期间死亡的，其直系亲属或者有关单位应及时到养老保险事业管理中心办理注销手续。
违反前款规定，以伪造有关证件或者其他手段多领、冒领养老金的，养老保险事业管理中心应追回其多领、冒领的金额；情节严重的，市社会保险管理局可处以多领、冒领金额一至五倍的罚款。
第四十八条当事人对市社会保险管理局作出的处罚决定不服的，可以在接到处罚决定书之日起十五日内，向市社会保险委员会申请复议；对复议决定不服的，可以在接到复议决定书之日起十五日内向人民法院提起诉讼。当事人也可以直接向人民法院提起诉讼。
第四十九条对扰乱养老保险机构正常工作秩序的人员，由公安机关依照《中华人民共和国治安管理处罚条例》予以处罚。
第七章附则
第五十条外商投资企业职工养老保险的过渡办法、私营企业职工和个体工商户的养老保险办法，按本办法的原则另行制定。
第五十一条本市单位补充养老保险和个人储蓄养老保险办法另行制定。
第五十二条本办法的具体应用问题由市社会保险管理局负责解释。
第五十三条本办法自一九九四年六月一日起施行。
一九九三年一月一日至本办法施行以前尚未实施《上海市城镇职工养老保险制度改革实施方案》的单位和个人，应在本办法施行之日起三个月内，按该方案的要求履行应当承担的义务。
Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence
OUTLINE
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.
